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Turnaround

From this moment on there were important phonograms between Supermarina and the CC.FF.NN.BB. and viceversa.

The difficulties in communicating between the Supermarina radio station and those of the FF.NN.BB., and vice versa, meant that between the preparation of a message and its transmission could also incur a delay of over an hour and a half . Therefore, to continue to have a linear chronological view of events, the hours relating to the delivery of these messages to the recipients are highlighted. In fact, it was only at that moment that the Entities concerned became aware of the information contained therein as well as of any orders to be executed; however, the time of compilation and transmission are also indicated. The significant time delay between the time of compilation of the message and its delivery to the recipient was due to the need to carry out the following operations:

  • their initial encryption,  

  • possibility to transmit them,  

  • their decryption upon receipt.

Affondamento_corazzata_Roma_1943-9-9_map

141 hours 109.

The CC.FF.NN.BB. received the following message: “PAPA Cifr. 9 bis to all units in navigation Supermarina 71325 - La Maddalena occupied by German forces our Command overwhelmed alt Units dependent on Silurantisom headed for La Maddalena instead go immediately to Portoferraio except for those aggregated Naval Forces from Battaglia (alt) Milan 132009 ”. Immediately after, both the Command in Chief of the Fleet and the Dependent Divisions intercepted the following telecipher sent by Supermarina to the CC.TT. “Vivaldi and Da Noli. Supermarina 97424 - Continue to Bona, possibly joining the Battaglia Naval Force (alt) Milan 13909 ”.

142909 hours.

The CC.FF.NN.BB. ordered the 14th destroyer squadron to take the stern seat of the 12th squadron.

Thus, for safety reasons with respect to the minefields, a long line was formed, opened by the torpedo boats, followed by the 7th, 8th and 9th Naval Divisions and the 12th and 14th Squadrons

143009 hours

The FF.NN.BB. they took the safety route of 65 ° to get to the Strait of Bonifacio.

143309 hours

Ugolino Vivaldi and Antonio Da Noli received the following phonogram: “PAPA Cifr. 19 ter from Supermarina to Vivaldi et Da Noli pc Roma for FF.NN.BB. Exit the estuary towards the west and sink all the German vehicles carrying out the Sardinia-Corsica traffic alt Milan 134909 "._ cc781905-5cde-3194-bb3b-136bad5cf58d_

However, Admiral Sansonetti reports: “Except that around 11.00 on the 9th, I was called to the teleprinter by Admiral Brivonesi, and from him I learned that the estuary was in the hands of the Germans. So I immediately sent a telegraph to Rome to reverse the route and certainly proceed to Bona ”. This message is also reported by Admiral Giuseppe Fioravanzo who writes “towards 13.00 Supermarina warned that Germanic forces had occupied La Maddalena, ordered the FF.NN. with radio message completed at 13.16 to direct to Bona. It was able to receive on Rome at 14.24 ”.

Admiral Bergamini, following the instructions received with the above message, communicated with ultra-short waves to all the dependent ships "Approached at a time of 180 ° to port".

This maneuver, immediately carried out, was necessary to reduce the range of evolution of the ships and not to end up on minefields. The Squadron, having reversed the course on the left at the same time, was always in line in a row but with the 14th destroyer squadron at the head followed by the 12th, by the battleships of the 9th Division (Vittorio Veneto, Italy, Rome), by the cruisers of the 8th Division (Attilio Regolo, Giuseppe Garibaldi and Duca degli Abruzzi), by those of the 7th Division (Raimondo Montecuccoli, Duke of Aosta, Eugenio di Savoia) and by the torpedo boats. The flagships of the various Naval Divisions and those of the destroyer squadrons then followed their sectionaries. This maneuver, immediately carried out, was necessary to reduce the range of evolution of the ships and not to end up on minefields. The Squadron, having reversed the course on the left at the same time, was always in line in a row but with the 14th destroyer squadron at the head followed by the 12th, by the battleships of the 9th Division (Vittorio Veneto, Italy, Rome), by the cruisers of the 8th Division (Attilio Regolo, Giuseppe Garibaldi and Duca degli Abruzzi), by those of the 7th Division (Raimondo Montecuccoli, Duke of Aosta, Eugenio di Savoia) and by the torpedo boats. The flagships of the various naval divisions and those of the destroyer squadrons then followed their sectionaries.

The maneuver was described by Admiral Biancheri in his Report as follows: "The maneuver, performed at high speed, is carried out in a brilliant way which testifies to the perfect training of the Commanders".

144 hours 109

The CC.FF.NN.BB. ordered to reduce the speed to 18 knots and to take route 285 ° (as shown by the units' War Navigation Reports) which was the safety route necessary to exit the Gulf of Asinara and then be able to approach south for Bona.

144609 hours

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