5 SEPTEMBER -
General Castellano sent on 5 September to General Ambrosio, through Major Marchesi, the documents received on the 3rd, as well as the agreements reached with the Allies regarding the procedures to be respected for the official declaration of the armistice. In the accompanying letter he wrote:
“as much as I did everything possible to do it, I could not have any information about the precise landing site. I cannot say anything precise about the date but from confidential information I assume that the landing may take place between 10 and 15 September, perhaps on the 12th ".
At the request of General Ambrosio, Major Marchesi confirmed that he too believed that the presumable date for the declaration of the Armistice could be around 12. However, he pointed out that, on this subject, they had not obtained any information on the matter. Therefore the date of 12 was purely hypothetical.
Nonetheless, General Ambrosio believed that the date of the presumable announcement of the armistice was 12, and consequently all the measures and acts to face the armistice, both with regard to agreements with the Allies and to react against any German reactions, were set as if they were to be implemented by that date.
In the early afternoon of the 5th, the main documents were immediately translated, delivered to General Ambrosio and sent to Marshal Badoglio.
In the afternoon, General Ambrosio summoned the three Ministers of the Armed Forces:
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Sorice,
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de Courten and
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Sandalli,
to inform them generically of the situation and making it clear that the documents received were those under examination in order to reach the signing of the armistice.
Among other things, he highlighted:
"that the armistice conditions appeared harsh but that in the Additional Document of Quebec this harshness was mitigated in relation to our future competition against the Germans, and that therefore it was our duty to work loyally in the address wanted by the Government ".
Furthermore, Admiral de Courten reported, in his Report of February 12, 1944, that:
"he asked me for a torpedo boat to take a group of Italian officers from Gaeta to Ustica where, at dawn on the 7th, an English torpedo boat would be found, which would have withdrawn the Italian officers to bring them in Palermo and delivered two senior Anglo-American officers, who were to be transported to Gaeta and then proceeded to Rome.
The Chief of the General Staff, confirming and clarifying a request made in the morning by the Deputy General Staff to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy, also asked, to join the aforementioned group, a senior naval officer, who was well aware the operational situation and the location and efficiency of the units of the Royal Navy.
I appointed for the mission the captain of the vessel Giuriati, of the Operations Department of Supermarina, and I proposed the solution of sending a corvette instead of a torpedo boat, for reasons of autonomy and resistance to the sea.
On that occasion, the Chief of the General Staff mentioned to me that the sending of this mission was in correlation with the conclusion of an armistice, the notification of which was scheduled for one of the days between 10 and 15 September, more likely 12. or on the 13th He further informed me that,according to all likelihood, the Fleet (the bulk of which was concentrated in La Spezia) should have moved to La Maddalena, where it was possible that the Sovereign wanted to go with the Royal Family and a part of the Government. "
6 SEPTEMBER -
Between the evening of the 5th and the morning of the 6th of September the mission of the Ibis corvette was completed: departure from Gaeta at 8.00 pm on the 6th, arriving in Ustica at dawn on the 7th, returning to Gaeta on the evening of the 7th, after dark.
In order for the mission to take place in a truly secret form, no written order was given for it, but Rear Admiral Maugeri, Head of the Information Department of the General Staff, was verbally instructed to conduct it. The mission was carried out regularly and the corvette, as soon as the two Anglo-American officers landed in Gaeta, was sent on to the deserted harbor of Porto Conte, in Sardinia, with the order to remain in strict quarantine until further notice.
Admiral de Courten after this interview felt it was right to examine the situation with Admiral Luigi Sansonetti, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy, deeming it necessary:
“To inform him, albeit in a generic way, of the Government's intention to negotiate an armistice and of my impressions.
The possibilities of a concentration of the Fleet in La Maddalena were also examined, where space and available moorings required special arrangements to allow the safe accommodation of a large number of naval units. We took into careful consideration the situation deriving, on the one hand from the eventuality of an armistice, of which, moreover, neither the prospects of effective conclusion, nor the nature of the clauses, nor the date of entry into force, and on the other hand side by the possible imminence of a new enemy attack, this time directed against the heart of the national territory. We agreed that, all considered, the preparations to counter the foreseeable Anglo-American offensive should not suffer any interruption ”.
Admiral de Courten after this interview felt it was right to examine the situation with Admiral Luigi Sansonetti, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy, deeming it necessary:
"to inform him, albeit in a generic way, of the Government's intention to negotiate an armistice and of my impressions.
The possibilities of a concentration of the Fleet in La Maddalena were also examined, where space and available moorings made special arrangements necessary to allow the safe accommodation of a large number of naval units. We took into careful consideration the situation deriving, on the one hand from the eventuality of an armistice, of which, moreover, neither the prospects of effective conclusion, nor the character of the clauses, nor the date of entry into force, and on the other hand side by the possible imminence of a new enemy attack, this time directed against the heart of the national territory. We agreed that, all considered, the preparations to counter the foreseeable Anglo-American offensive should not suffer any interruption ”.